Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2011

Schroeder Investments v. Clyde C. Edwards, Linda
K. Edwards, Utah Department of Transportation :
Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brent A. Burnett; Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General; Attorneys for Defendant.
Troy L. Booher; Noella A. Sudbury; Zimmerman, Jones, Booher; Wade R. Budge; Snell and Wilmer;
Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Schroeder Investments v. Edwards, No. 20110910 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2011).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2981

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SCHROEDER INVESTMENTS, L.C,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
No. 20110910-SC

CLYDE C. EDWARDS,
LINDA K. EDWARDS,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, and DOES 1
through 10,

On appeal from the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County,
Honorable Darold J. McDade,
District Court No. 090404414

Defendants/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Brent A. Burnett
Mark L. Shurtleff

Troy L. Booher (9419)
Noella A. Sudbury (12682)

OFFICE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC

P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858

Kearns Building, Suite 721
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
tbooher@zjbappeals.com
(801) 924-0200

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Utah Department of Transportation

Wade R. Budge (8482)
SNELL & WlLMER LLP

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
wbudge@swlaw.com
(801) 257-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellapfaj^
Schroeder Investmenf^AkfJKPPELlAJB COUI
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AUG 1 5 2012

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

SCHROEDER INVESTMENTS, L.C.,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
No. 20110910-SC
v.
CLYDE C. EDWARDS,
LINDA K. EDWARDS,
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, and DOES 1
through 10,

On appeal from the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Utah County,
Honorable Darold J. McDade,
District Court No. 090404414

Defendants/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Brent A. Burnett
MarkL.Shurtleff

Troy L. Booher (9419)
Noella A. Sudbury (12682)

OEFICE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER LLC

P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0858

Kearns Building, Suite 721
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
tbooher@zjbappeals.com
(801) 924-0200

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Utah Department of Transportation

Wade R. Budge (8482)
SNELL & WILMER LLP

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
wbudge@swlaw.com
(801) 257-1900
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Schroeder Investments, L.C.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Table of Contents
Introduction

1

Statement of Facts

3

Argument

4

I.

Under Utah's Eminent Domain Statutes, Schroeder May
Condemn Land to Widen Its Easement to Build a Public Road

4

A.

Schroeder Has a Statutory Right to Condemn

5

B.

Case Law Confirms Schroeder's Right to Condemn

7

C

UDOT's Authorities Are Beside the Point

10

D.

Section 78B-6-501(3)(e) Authorizes Schroeder to
Condemn Land to Widen an Easement to Build a Public
Road

11

If Section 78B-6-501 (7) Applies, It Confirms That
Schroeder May Prosecute the Condemnation Action

12

The More Necessary Public Use Doctrine Does Not Apply
Because the Proposed Public Uses Are Compatible

15

E.
II.

A.

B.

An Existing Use is Incompatible With a Proposed Use
Only If, By Reason of its Nature or Character, the
Proposed Use " Supersedes or Destroys" the Existing
Use

16

Material Issues of Fact As To Whether Schroeder"s Road
Is Compatible With UDOTs Detention Basin Preclude
Summary Judgment and Requires Reversal

18

Conclusion

19

Certificate of Compliance With Rule 24(f)(1)

21

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

Table of Authorities
CASES
Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co. v. N. Utah Mining Co.,
162 P. 65 (Utah 1916)

8

Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R. Corporation,
23 Pick. 360 (Mass. 1839)

16,17

Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission,
725 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1986)

13,14

Doelle v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.,
872 F.2d 942 (10th Cir. 1989)
Francis v. State,
2010 UT 62,248 P.3d 44

7, 9
4

Franco v. Church of Tesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints,
2001 UT 25,21 P.3d 198

18

Glenbrook Homeowners Assoc, v. Pettit,
919 P.2d 1061 (Nev. 1996)

15

Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn,
2003 UT 50,84 P.3d 1134

7

Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr.,
2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958

7

Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley,
28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296 (1904)

9

Tacobsoen v. Memmott,
354 P.2d 569 (Utah 1960)

8

Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen,
159 P. 541 (Utah 1916)

8

Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFT Ranch P'ship,
2011 UT 50,267 P.3d 863
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co.,
174 P. 172 (Utah 1918)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
8

Nash v. Clark,
75 P. 371 (Utah 1904)

7,9

Or. Short Line R.R. Co. v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co.,
120 Utah 621,237 P.2d 829 (1951)

8

Or. Short Line R.R. Co. v. Tones,
80 P. 732 (Utah 1905)

9

Or. Short Line R.R. Co. v. Russell,
27 Utah 457, 76 P. 345 (1904)

9

Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp.,
392 P.2d 620 (Utah 1964)

8

Postal Tel. Cable Co. of Utah v. Or. Short-Line R.R. Co.,
23 Utah 474, 65 P. 735 (1901)

9,16

Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Telluride Power Transmission Co.,
23 Utah 22, 63 P. 995 (1900)

9

Salt Lake & Utah R.R. Co. v. Schramm,
56 Utah 53,189 P. 90 (1920)

8

Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co.,
24 Utah 249,67 P. 672(1902)

17

State v. Schofield,
2002 UT132,63 P.3d 667

5

Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co.,
121 P. 584 (Utah 1911).

9

Telluride Power Co. v. Bruneau,
125 P. 399 (Utah 1912)

9

Town of Perry v. Thomas,
82 Utah 159,22 P.2d 343 (1933)

11

Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consol. Mining Co.,
255 P. 672 (Utah 1926)

8

Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc.,
83 Utah 545,31 P.2d 624 (1934)

8

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Lake Irrigation Co. v. Tensen,
161 P. 677 (Utah 1916)
Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, Inc.,
2000 UT 2,993 P.2d 207
Wasatch Gas Co. v. Bouwhuis,
82 Utah 573,26 P.2d 548 (1933)
Watkins v. Simonds,
354 P.2d 852 (Utah 1960)

8
12
8
7,8

Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co.,
602 P.2d 684 (Utah 1979)

8

Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp.,
2002 UT 94,54 P.3d 1177

2

STATUTES
Utah Code § 68-3-3

14

Utah Code § 78-34-1

8

Utah Code § 78B-6-501

passim

Utah Code § 78B-6-504

4, 6

Utah Code § 78B-6-505

6

Utah Code § 78B-6-507

6

Utah Code § 78B-6-517

6

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Introduction
In the response brief, UDOT does not dispute the existence of the
compatible use doctrine or that its contours are as described in the opening brief.
Instead, UDOT raises two alternative arguments, both of which fail. UDOTs
first argument—private parties may not condemn land for public use—is
contrary to a century of case law, conflicts with language in the eminent domain
statutes, and was rejected by the district court in a ruling the Utah Court of
Appeals declined to review. UDOTs second argument—UDOTs use of the land
is the more necessary use—is irrelevant under the compatible use doctrine
because courts need only weigh the relative necessity of incompatible public
uses. If the uses are compatible, the public may benefit from both uses.
In the district court, UDOT argued that compatible use doctrine was too
narrow to require accommodation of two different types of uses. But on appeal
UDOT agrees that the compatible use doctrine is well-established under Utah
law and "presupposes that two different public uses can jointly occupy a parcel
of land/' (Resp. Br. at 12.) Because different types of uses can be compatible, the
issue becomes whether UDOTs detention basin is compatible with Schroeder's
widening of his easement to construct a public road, where Schroeder will
donate land and pay any associated costs necessary to permit UDOT to adjust its
plans for the basin. UDOT conceded in the district court that both uses could be
accommodated at no additional cost and with little delay. (RT.687:30.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

("Schroeder is willing to augment the use by adding some additional property,
and so that won't cost, it won't delay, we can accomplish this.") Those
concessions demonstrate that the two public uses are compatible.
In the response brief, UDOT understandably attempts to re-characterize its
concessions. UDOT claims it is "unknown whether the detention basin could be
built, in part, on a different site" and uncertain whether federal permits could be
obtained to accommodate both parties' plans. (Resp. Br. at 14.) UDOT's recharacterization of its concessions, at best, reveals disputed issues of material fact
concerning whether the uses are compatible, something that precludes summary
judgment. In the response brief, UDOT concedes that the district court should
have granted its summary judgment motion only if "there are no genuine issues
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 1
(Resp. Br. at 2.) This court should reverse.
1

While the district court entered findings of fact, the standard of review is
correctness because the issue is whether the court applied the correct legal
standard under compatible use doctrine. (AOB at 2-3.) UDOT agrees that this
court reviews the district court's order for correctness. (Resp. Br. at 2.) UDOT has
not argued that the district court's findings indicate that the proceedings were
transformed into a bench trial. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002
UT 94, I f 9-10,54 P.3d 1177. Nor could it. No live witnesses testified at the
hearing and no witnesses were cross-examined, leaving the evidence proffers
more akin to a statement of facts in summary judgment papers than a bench trial.
(R. 687.) For that reason, the court had no opportunity to, and did not, make
credibility determinations. (R. 630-35). Regardless, the findings merely reiterate
Schroeder's position that UDOT would have to alter its planned detention pond
for the two public uses to be compatible. The issue in this appeal is the legal
issue of whether compatible use doctrine can require alteration of an existing
use, not the factual issue of whether UDOT's use had to be altered.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Statement of Facts
Because UDOTs response brief raises new arguments as alternative
grounds to affirm, Schroeder will provide some additional facts to place the new
arguments in the appropriate context.
On November 30,2009, Schroeder filed a complaint against the Edwards
containing a condemnation claim directed at the Edwards' parcel. (R.l-8.) On
September 24, 2010, after UDOT purchased part of that parcel—thereby dividing
the original parcel into three parcels—Schroeder filed an amended complaint
naming UDOT as a defendant and directing a condemnation claim at UDOTs
newly created parcel. (R.151-59.) The Edwards filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that Schroeder could not condemn land for public use because it is not a
governmental entity. (R.355,400.) UDOT joined the motion. (Id.)
After briefing and argument, the district court denied the motions on the
ground that "a private party may institute condemnation proceedings so long as
it is pursuing a public use and meets applicable statutory requirements [and that
Schroeder] has properly alleged a public use and has otherwise met the statutory
requirements to institute a condemnation proceeding/' (R.400.)
The Edwards filed a motion to reconsider and, after it was denied, filed a
petition for review of the interlocutory orders rejecting the argument that
Schroeder could not prosecute his condemnation claims as a private entity.
(R.646-60.) The Utah Court of Appeals denied the petition. (R.682.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Argument
I.

Under Utah's Eminent Domain Statutes, Schroeder May Condemn Land
to Widen Its Easement to Build a Public Road
In the response brief, UDOT asks this court to avoid defining the scope of

compatible use doctrine and instead to affirm on the alternative ground that
under Utah's eminent domain statutes private parties possess no authority to
condemn land for public use. This court may, and should, decline to reach the
alternative ground because, as demonstrated below, UDOT provides an
incomplete analysis of the alternative ground in its response brief. Francis v.
State, 2010 UT 62, If 21, 248 P.3d 44 (declining the State's invitation to affirm on
alternative grounds).
If this court choses to reach the merits of the alternative ground, it should
reject UDOTs position. As demonstrated below, it is well established under
Utah law that the authority to condemn land stems from the nature of the use,
not the identity of the condemnor. Utah Code § 78B-6-504 (listing conditions
precedent to a taking). That legal authority includes the unambiguous language
of the eminent domain statutes as well as case law spanning more than a century
recognizing that, in certain circumstances, private parties may condemn land for
public use. Because those circumstances are present here, if this court addresses
UDOTs alternative ground to affirm, it should reject it.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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A.

Schroeder Has a Statutory Right to Condemn

UDOT argues that this court should hold that Schroeder may not employ
the eminent domain statutes because there "is no express delegation to private
entities of the power to condemn land to be used as public roads or byroads/7
(Resp. Br. at 9.) UDOTs argument rests upon that fact that section 78B-6-501 —
which specifies the public uses on behalf of which "the right of eminent domain
may be exercised"—is written in the passive voice and does not address "what
uses of eminent domain are available to private entities and which are only
available to government." (Id. at 10.) According to UDOT, that lack of
specificity means that private entities may not condemn. But UDOTs argument
fails because, as discussed below, Utah's eminent domain statutes elsewhere
expressly contemplate that private parties may condemn land for public uses.
When interpreting statutes, this court determines a statute's meaning by
first looking to the statute's plain language. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT132, | 8,
63 P.3d 667. A statute's plain language "is to be read as a whole, and its
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and
with other statutes under the same and related chapters." IdL Utah's eminent
domain statutes first set forth the four "[conditions precedent" to a taking, none
of which concern the identity of the condemnor:
(a) the use to which it is to be applied is a use
authorized by law;
(b) the taking is necessary for the use;

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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(c) construction and use of all property sought to be
condemned will commence within a reasonable time
. . . [and]
(d) if already appropriated to some public use, the
public use to which it is to be applied is a more
necessary public use.2
Utah Code § 78B-6-504. Section 78B-6-507 then expressly defines "plaintiff" for
purposes of eminent domain, not exclusively as a governmental entity, but as a
"corporation, association, commission, or person." IdL § 78B-6-507. Another
section governing the voluntary dismissal of condemnation actions states that the
"Condemner, whether a public or private body," may at any time prior to final
payment of compensation, decide to abandon the condemnation action so long as
reimbursement for any damages suffered is provided to the other party. Id. §
78B-6-517 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, "[a] person other than a political
subdivision of the state, that seeks to acquire property by eminent domain" shall
"before filing an eminent domain action, make a reasonable effort to negotiate
with the property owner for the purchase of the property." Id. § 78B-6~505(2)
(emphasis added).
Those statutes expressly contemplate that private bodies have the right of
eminent domain even though section 78B-6-501 does not address this issue. In
light of the references to private parties in the eminent domain statutes, section

2

The district court concluded that Schroeder satisfied subsections (a), (b), and (c),
but not subsection (d) because the compatible use doctrine did not apply and
UDOTs use was more necessary. On appeal, UDOT does not contend that
subsection (b) and (c) are not satisfied, and thus Schroeder limits its reply to the
requirements contained in subsections (a) and (d).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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78B-6-501 must be read to authorize private entities to exercise the right of
eminent domain despite the lack of any reference to private entities in section
78B-6-501. Otherwise, the references to private parties elsewhere in the eminent
domain statute have no purpose and make no sense. Hall v. Utah State Dep't of
Corr., 2001 UT 34, ^ 15,24 P.3d 958 (noting that when interpreting statutes this
court seeks "to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and . . .
accordingly avoid [s] interpretations that will render portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative/7) To give meaning to all of the language in the
eminent domain statutes, this court should interpret them as providing private
entities the right to exercise eminent domain under certain circumstances.
B.

Case Law Confirms Schroeder's Right to Condemn

Confirming that section 78B-6-501 need not expressly identify that private
entities have the right to eminent domain, Utah case law is replete with instances
where private corporations,3 landowners,4 and citizens5 have appropriately
brought condemnation actions. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, |
27, 84 P.3d 1134 (noting that Utah law gives water users the right of eminent
3

Doelle v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel, 872 F.2d 942,945 (10th Or. 1989) ("Under
[Utah's eminent domain statutes] a corporation may seek condemnation by filing
a complaint in a court of law/7).
4

Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371,374-75 (Utah 1904) (private landowner entitled to
condemn right of way in neighboring landowner's ditch) (affd Clark v. Nash,
198 U.S. 361 (1905)).
5 Watkins v. Simonds, 354 P.2d 852,855 (Utah 1960) (citing Utah Code § 78-341(5)) ("[t]he right of private citizens, in a proper case, to condemn an irrigation
easement is recognized by statute").
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

domain to share in the use of existing ditches and canals); Williams v. Hyrum
Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684, 685, 688 (Utah 1979) (private instillation
company instituting condemnation proceedings to construct a receiver station);
Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 392 P.2d 620, 620 (Utah 1964)
(private corporation brought action to condemn lands for construction of a
reservoir); Watkins, 354 P.2d at 855 (citing Utah Code § 78-34-1(5)) ("[t]he right of
private citizens, in a proper case, to condemn an irrigation easement is
recognized by statute."); Tacobsoen v. Memmott, 354 P.2d 569,570 (Utah 1960)
(individual and mining company); Or. Short Line R.R. Co. v. Denver & Rio
Grande W.R.R. Co., 120 Utah 621,237 P.2d 829,830-31 (1951) (railroad company
could condemn leased land); Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83
Utah 545,31 P.2d 624, 625 (1934) (mining company); Wasatch Gas Co. v.
Bouwhuis, 82 Utah 573,26 P.2d 548,549 (1933) (gas company exercised eminent
domain to obtain easement); Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consol.
Mining Co., 255 P. 672, 672-73 (Utah 1926) (mining company); Salt Lake & Utah
R.R. Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53,189 P. 90, 91 (1920) (railroad company);
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 174 P. 172,173,
177-78 (Utah 1918) (mining company could institute condemnation proceedings
for an easement to use a mining tunnel); Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co. v. N. Utah
Mining Co., 162 P. 65, 66 (Utah 1916) (railroad company); Utah Lake Irrigation
Co. v. lensen, 161 P. 677, 677 (Utah 1916) (irrigation company); Ketchum Coal Co.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. Christensen, 159 P. 541,541-42 (Utah 1916) (mining company); Telluride
Power Co. v. Bruneau, 125 P. 399,400 (Utah 1912) (power company); Tanner v.
Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 121 P. 584,585,589 (Utah 1911) (irrigation
company); Or. Short Line R.R. Co. v. Tones, 80 P. 732, 732 (Utah 1905) (railroad
company); Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296,
298-99 (1904) (mining company condemned land for road); Or. Short Line R.R.
Co. v. Russell 27 Utah 457, 76 P. 345,346 (1904) (railroad company); Nash v.
Clark, 75 P. at 374-75 (private citizen condemned right of way); Postal Tel. Cable
Co. of Utah v. Or. Short-Line R.R. Co., 23 Utah 474,65 P. 735, 736 (1901)
(telegraph company); Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Telluride Power Transmission
Co., 23 Utah 22, 63 P. 995 (1900) (railroad company), appeal dismissed, Telluride
Power Transmission Co. v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 187 U.S. 569 (1903).
These cases embody over 100 years of legal precedent recognizing the
condemnation rights of non-governmental entities. UDOT has made no effort to
address any of the cases recognizing private condemnations, let alone provide
some reason to believe that the Utah Legislature intended to overturn that
precedent by failing to amend the language to reference private parties in section
78B-6-501. Because UDOT fails to address this court's case law, this coiurt should
not address UDOT's alternative ground. If this court does address the
alternative ground, it should reject it based upon this court's long-standing
precedent.
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C.

UDOT's Authorities Are Beside the Point

Instead of addressing the abundant case law recognizing the right of
private parties to condemn land for public use, UDOT advances three arguments
that are beside the point. This court should reject them.
First, UDOT cites cases to support the unremarkable position that "the
State unquestionably has the right to take or damage private property when
necessary for public use/ 7 (Resp. Br. at 8). Schroeder does not contest UDOTs
right to condemn, although it is worth noting that section 78B-6-501 also does not
state that governmental entities may condemn land for public purposes. The
issue on the merits instead is whether UDOTs use is compatible with
Schroeder's use. And under UDOT's alternative argument, the issue is whether
the eminent domain statutes authorize Schroeder to expand an easement to
construct a public road. UDOTs argument is beside the point.
Second, UDOT cites a myriad of cases holding that a city cannot condemn
land outside of its municipal boundaries without express statutory authority.
(Resp. Br. at 8). Again, Schroeder does not challenge the validity or underlying
principles in those cases and fails to see their relevance. Schroeder is not a city or
municipal entity seeking to condemn land outside of its boundaries. Schroeder is
a private party seeking to widen its current easement by a few feet so it can
construct a public road that complies with city ordinances.
Third, UDOT assumes that Schroeder's statutory authority must come
from section 78B-6-501(7), which concerns residences and farms, and then argues
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the eminent domain statutes do not authorize Schroeder to widen its
easement. But as demonstrated below, UDOTs assumption, like its analysis, is
off the mark.
D.

Section 78B~6»501(3)(e) Authorizes Schroeder to Condemn Land to
Widen an Easement to Build a Public Road

Schroeder expressly relied on Utah Code section 78B-6-501(3)(e) when it
filed its condemnation complaint. (R.6.). This section has not changed in
substance since 2008 and authorizes Schroeder's condemnation action. (R.400
(trial court order stating Schroeder "has properly alleged a public use and has
otherwise met the statutory requirements to institute a condemnation
proceeding.")). Strangely, UDOT chooses to ignore this section in articulating its
alternative ground to affirm.
Under the plain language of section 78B-6-501(3)(e), "the right of eminent
domain may be exercised on behalf of the following public uses:... roads . . . for
public vehicular use/7 Utah Code § 78B-6-501(3)(e); see also Town of Perry v.
Thomas, 82 Utah 159,22 P.2d 343,346 (1933) ("It is well settled that the taking of
land for public streets, highways, and roads is a public use."). The road
Schroeder will build once its easement is widened will be subject to public
vehicular use for accessing numerous properties, including Schroeder's property.
Schroeder cited section 78B-6-501(3)(e) in its complaint (R.6) and the
district court determined that Schroeder had the authority to maintain a
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condemnation action under that section.6 (R.400.) Because the plain language of
the applicable statute unambiguously authorizes the condemnation of land for a
road, this court need not look beyond that language. Vigos v. Mountainland
Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2,113,993 P.2d 207 ("The plain language controls the
interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity do we look beyond the
plain language to legislative history or policy considerations/7).
For that reason alone, this court should reject UDOTs alternative ground
argument, which does not mention, let alone address, section 78B-6-501(3)(e).
Instead, UDOT addresses only section 78B-6-501(7), which, as demonstrated
next, also provides Schroeder a basis to prosecute its condemnation claims.
E.

If Section 78B~6-501(7) Applies, It Confirms That Schroeder May
Prosecute the Condemnation Action

UDOT assumes that the only authority for Schroeder to prosecute its
condemnation action is section 78B-6-501(7). As demonstrated in the last section,
that assumption is false. But even if it were true, the result would be the same
because under the 2010 version of section 78B-6-501(7) in effect when UDOT was
named as a defendant in this lawsuit, Schroeder had the right to condemn a road
6

UDOT suggests that recognizing this right will lead to chaos as "[c]ities would
be faced with the creation of roads that they did not desire and that may, or may
not, meet the design and construction requirement for such roadways/7 (Resp.
Br. at 9.) UDOTs position is ironic since Schroeder needs to widen his easement
to comply with the road width requirements of Provo City. In addition, UDOTs
assertion is incorrect. Even though Schroeder currently has an easement, he
cannot build a road because the easement is not wide enough, which
demonstrates that possessing an easement is hardly sufficient to build a road.
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to its " proposed development/' For that additional reason, this court should
reject UDOTs alternative ground to affirm.
Because UDOT spends much of its brief outlining the various amendments
to section 78B-6-501(7), Schroeder will merely list them.
• In 2009, subsection (7) authorized the right of eminent domain to
construct "byroads leading from highways to residences and
farms." Utah Code Ann. § 78B~6~501(7) (West 2009).
• In 2010, the legislature amended subsection (7) to add the power
to exercise eminent domain to construct a " byroad [] leading from
a highway to an existing or proposed: (a) residence; (b)
development; or (c) farm." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6~501(7) (West
2010).
• In 2011, the legislature removed the phrase "existing or
proposed" from the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(7)
(West 2011).
UDOT discusses the amendments to subsection (7) because it assumes that
the 2009 version of the code applies to Schroeder's condemnation action against
UDOT. Based upon that assumption, UDOT argues that the addition of the
words "existing or proposed . . . development" reveals that only in 2010 did
parties —like Schroeder—have the right to condemn land to build roads to any
type of development. Again, UDOTs argument fails because its assumption is
incorrect.
To support its assumption that the 2009 version of the Utah Code governs,
UDOT cites Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335,1336
(Utah 1986), in a footnote for the proposition that "substantive rights are
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

determined by the law in place when the cause of action arose." (Resp. Br. at 9
n.l.) While UDOT has correctly stated the law, it has not addressed the issue
addressed in Carlucci and present here, namely when the cause of action arose.
In Carlucci, the court held that an amended version of a statute applied because a
wife's cause of action stemming from the death of her husband did not arise until
his employer had become insolvent, even though the injury that ultimately
caused his death occurred prior to the amendment. Carlucci, 725 P.2d at 1337-38.
Here, the eminent domain claim against UDOT did not arise until
Schroeder filed its complaint against UDOT. A condemnation action—unlike
actions for breach of contract or personal injuries —is not based upon past events
from which the legal claim arises and after which the claim must be filed within a
specified limitation period. For that reason, eminent domain claims are
governed by the version of the Utah Code operative at the time the claim is filed.
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFT Ranch Fship, 2011 UT 50, f 1 n. 1, 267 P.3d 863
(applying version of the eminent domain statutes operative at the time the
lawsuit was filed).
What UDOT fails to appreciate is that Schroeder filed the condemnation
claim against UDOT on September 23,2010. (R.153-59.) Therefore, the version of
the Utah Code applicable to the claims against UDOT is the 2010 version, not the
2009 version (and not the 2011 version).7 Under the 2010 version of section 78B7

Because the 2011 amendments to section 78B-6~501(7) do not expressly declare
themselves to be retroactive, the 2010 version applies. Utah Code § 68-3-3 (" A
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6-501(7), the right of eminent domain may be exercised for "byroads leading
from a highway to an existing or proposed residence; development; or farm."
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(7) (West 2010). In its condemnation claim against
UDOT, Schroeder seeks to widen an easement by a few feet to build a road to a
proposed storage facility.8 (Resp. Br. at 4.) Therefore, UDOT's alternative
ground also fails under section 78B~6-501(7).
This court should decline to reach UDOTs alternative ground to affirm
because it involves complex issues not adequately addressed by UDOT in the
response brief. If this court does address the alternative ground, it should reject
it because the applicable versions of both section 78B~6-501(3)(e) and section 78B6-501(7) authorize Schroeder to prosecute his condemnation claims against
UDOT.
II.

The More Necessary Public Use Doctrine Does Not Apply Because the
Proposed Public Uses Are Compatible
In its response brief, UDOT acknowledges that the position UDOT

persuaded the district court to adopt is incorrect because under the compatible
use doctrine "two different public uses can jointly occupy a parcel of land."
provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly
declared to be retroactive.").
8

It also is far from obvious that Schroeder did not have authority to widen its
easement to construct a road under the 2009 version of section 78B-6-501(7).
Glenbrook Homeowners Assoc, v. Pettit, 919 P.2d 1061 (Nev. 1996) (private party
had authority under identical statutory language to condemn land for
construction of a roadway despite no express language providing that authority
to private entities).
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(Resp. Br. at 12) (emphasis added). UDOT instead argues that its use of the
property as a detention basin is incompatible with Schroeder7s proposed use as a
public road because "UDOT plans to use all of the property in question for the I15 CORE Project/7 and that the compatible use doctrine cannot apply when the
existing party intends to use "full capacity of its land/7 (Id. at 13,14.)
In other words, UDOT argues that if accommodating two uses requires a
party to make modifications to its existing plans or use, then the two uses are
incompatible. But for all the reasons set forth in the opening brief—and
unaddressed in the response brief— UDOT7s position is contrary to Utah case
law, would incentivize abuse, and runs afoul of the eminent domain statutes7
purpose of encouraging land use that yields the greatest public benefit. (AOB at
21-28.)
A.

An Existing Use is Incompatible With a Proposed Use Only If, By
Reason of its Nature or Character, the Proposed Use "Supersedes
or Destroys77 the Existing Use

This court has held that a second use is incompatible with an existing use
only if "by reason of its nature or character77 the second public use necessarily
"supersedes or destroys the former use.77 Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. at 739.
Interference, inconvenience, or even permanent damage is insufficient to defeat a
condemnation action as long as the use survives. While a condemnor must
compensate for interference and inconvenience, they do not prevent the taking of
land for public use. Id.; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R.
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Corporation, 23 Pick. 360 (Mass. 1839) (noting two uses "stand together" even if
there is "some interference of the latter with the earlier/' because such
inconvenience may "be compensated for by damages."); Salt Lake City v. Salt
Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 24 Utah 249,67 P. 672,677 (1902) affd, 25
Utah 456, 71 P. 1069 (1903) ("Under the statutes of eminent domain the law
seems to be well settled that, where two public uses can stand together without
material impairment or impediment of one by the other, they must so stand.").9
This case is no different. UDOT conceded before the district court that
"[tjhere is no question" that it is "feasible" for the land to be used for both
projects, with little cost or delay to UDOT. (RT.687:30 (noting it "wont7 cost, it
won't delay, we can accomplish this."). Schroeder agreed to augment any land
UDOT needed to alter its detention pond plans by a few feet to accommodate
Schroeder's road. Schroeder also agreed to compensate UDOT for any damages
it suffered as a result of the alterations. (AOB at 9-10; RT.687:30,32.) Because
UDOT admitted that Schroeder's project can be accommodated, the two uses are
compatible. This court should reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment and allow Schroeder's condemnation action to move forward.

For a list of other cases supporting this proposition, see AOB at 20 n. 9.
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B.

Material Issues of Fact As To Whether Schroeder's Road Is
Compatible With UDOTs Detention Basin Preclude Summary
Judgment and Requires Reversal

UDOTs characterization of its concession in the response brief does not
change the result. This case is before the court on a district court's grant of
summary judgment. UDOT concedes that summary judgment is inappropriate if
there are any issues of material fact remaining. (Resp. Br. at 2); see also Franco v.
Church of Tesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, f 32, 21 P.3d 198.
Yet after articulating the correct standard of review, UDOT confirms that
summary judgment was inappropriate in its attempt to extricate itself from its
concession that both uses could be accommodated. UDOTs explanation of its
concession, if accepted, only demonstrates that disputed issues of material fact
remain concerning compatible use. According to UDOT,
Even if the parties could now agree on what property
should be given to UDOT, it remains unclear whether
the federal government's permits under the Clean
Water Act would allow the use of different land. [It is
also] unknown whether the detention basin could be
built, in part, on a different site.
(Resp. Br. at 14). UDOTs explanation reveals disputed issues of material fact
concerning whether another permit would be necessary or possible.
To understand this issue, it is worth putting UDOTs permit concerns in
context. At the summary judgment hearing, counsel for UDOT conceded that,
while the issue of the impact on wetlands "was not fully explored/' it appears
from the map of where wetlands are located that wetlands would not be
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impacted. (R.687:10.) Schroeder's counsel agreed that "the drawing that was
submitted does not show any wetlands in that area." (Id.) Thus, UDOTs
concern over permits is speculative, which is why it is not part of the district
court's order. Regardless, UDOTs explanations of its concession in the response
brief, as well as its statements at the hearing, serve only to confirm that the
record is insufficient to conclude as a matter of law that UDOTs use is
incompatible with Schroeder 7 s expanding its easement by a few feet.
Both UDOTs concession and its characterization of its concession in the
response brief demonstrate that the district court erred in ruling that compatible
use doctrine is inapplicable as a matter of law. For both reasons, this court
should vacate the entry of summary judgment.
Conclusion
This court should decline UDOTs invitation to address alternative ground
concerning whether Schroeder, as a private party, can employ the eminent
domain statutes to widen its easement to build a public road wide enough to
comply with local ordinances. If this court does address the alternative ground,
it should hold that Schroeder has authority to prosecute his condemnation action
under both section 78B-6-501(3)(e) and section 78B-6-501(7).
This court also should reject UDOTs attempt to re-characterize its
concession that both public uses could be accommodated. At best, UDOT has
demonstrated a disputed issue of material fact concerning whether UDOT would
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receive a permit to alter its pond, something that must be determined before it
can preclude the application of compatible use doctrine at this stage.
This court should vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of UDOT
and remand to permit the court to apply the correct legal standard in
determining whether the uses are compatible under the compatible use doctrine.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2012.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER

L.L.C.

Troy L. Booher
Noella A. Sudbury
Attorneys for Schroeder Investments, L.C.
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